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SARS-CoV-2 has hit Germany hard with (as of Easter 2020) more than 120,000
confirmed cases. The entire development of the pandemic has been accompanied
by a critical debate about whether the Federal Government and the Länder (states)
took the appropriate measures to fight the virus. The first objective of this post is to
show which legal measures are available to the Federal Government and the Länder
and to briefly report which of those have been applied to. It discusses whether
extraordinary times are the right moment for constitutional amendments and why a
critical reflection of the current legislative changes is not only necessary but essential
for the understanding of our constitution.
Combating the Virus with Federal Emergency
Powers?
Since the very beginning of the COVID-19 crisis, a debate emerged on whether
a state of emergency could be declared. The Grundgesetz (the German Federal
Constitution) provides an “Emergency Constitution” in several Articles (12a III-VI,
53a, 57a, 87a, 91, 115a sq.). At first glance, the mere existence of those instruments
does not seem to be remarkable. However, regarding the Constitution’s history
of origins and background, they are not to be taken for granted. The founders of
the Constitution gravely feared a new version of the Reich President’s right to
issue emergency decrees under Article 48 Weimar Constitution (1919), on the
basis of which essential basic rights and liberties were suspended in 1933 (the
most known is the Reichstag Fire Decree; referred to here as well). Accordingly,
the new established Grundgesetz from 1949 initially refrained from an explicit
“Emergency Constitution” until, under the impression of an ever approaching Cold
War, emergency articles were incorporated in 1968.
For example, Article 91 of the Grundgesetz was incorporated, on the basis of which
a state of internal emergency (Innerer Notstand) can be declared. Unlike Article 48 of
the Weimar Constitution however, Article 91 of the Grundgesetz does not allow for a
shift of powers towards the executive branch or special interventions in fundamental
rights. Instead, the declaration of a state of internal emergency enables the Federal
Government and the Länder to provide mutual administrative assistance. As per
Article 91 of the Grundgesetz, a state of internal emergency can only be declared in
“order to avert an imminent danger to the existence or free democratic basic order
of the Federation or of a Land”. As of Easter 2020, SARS-CoV-2 has claimed almost
3.000 lives in Germany. However and as of now, the Virus is neither a hazard to
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the free democratic order nor to the existence of the Federation or a Land, so that
a state of internal emergency cannot be declared within the narrow boundaries of
Article 91 Grundgesetz.
Somewhat surprisingly, despite the requirements for the declaration of a state of
internal emergency are not being met, the Bundeswehr (Federal military) is currently
deployed in 14 of the 16 Länder. As part of a civil mission the Bundeswehr helps out
with physicians, nursing staff and needed medical equipment. This mission is based
on Article 35 I Grundgesetz which obliges all the federal and Land authorities to
render legal and administrative assistance to one another. Therefore, all authorities
of the Federation as well as of the Länder can ask the Bundeswehr for technical-
logistical support, which the Länder are in need of: Right now, the Bundeswehr is
carrying out its largest mission since its establishment in 1955. However, Article
35 I of the Grundgesetz does not cover armed missions, so that, even in times of
COVID-19, the competences of the Bundeswehr are limited.
COVID-19 and the Disaster Case Scenario
Germany is a federal republic. Deriving from this principle and according to Article
70 of the Grundgesetz the Länder (and not the Federation!) shall have the right
to legislate as far as the Grundgesetz does not confer the legislative power to
Federation. Pursuant to Article 73 I No. 1 of the Grundgesetz the Federation has
exclusive legislative power with respect to foreign affairs and defence, including
protection of the civilian population. However, this section does not cover the
competences to avert dangers for public safety (Gefahrenabwehr). Therefore, the
respective authorities in the Länder have the competence to avert dangers for public
safety. This includes the right to declare a “state of disaster” (Katastrophenfall).
Every single of the 16 Länder passed its own Disaster Protection Act (see here)
being applicable when disaster actually strikes. Every Disaster Protection Act has
its own definition of disaster. For example, the Disaster Protection Act of the Land
North-Rhine Westphalia (the most populous Land with about 18 million inhabitants)
defines in § 1 II No. 2 that a disaster “is a damaging event which endangers or
substantially impairs the life, health or vital supplies of numerous people, animals,
natural resources or substantial material assets to such an unusual extent that the
resulting threat to public safety can only be effectively countered if the competent
authorities and services, organizations and deployed forces work together under the
uniform overall management of the competent civil protection authority.”
Without doubt COVID-19 endangers the life of numerous people; in the meantime
almost 3,000 people in Germany have lost their life. Consequently, the competent
authorities in the Länder facing COVID-19 can declare a state of disaster. All of the
16 different Disaster Protection Acts have in common that in case of a disaster a
more streamlined command structure is to be given to the authorities. For example,
according to Article 2 Disaster Protection Act (Bavaria) the cities (Kreisfreie Städte)
and districts (Kreise) are usually the responsible authorities. However, when a state
of disaster is declared the Bavarian Government (Staatsregierung) respectively the
Bavarian Ministry of the Interior (Landesinnenministerium) can attain competence.
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So far, from the 16 Länder only Bavaria has used these means and, for the first
time in its history it has done so not limited to certain areas but throughout its entire
territory. It remains to be seen whether other Länder will follow.
The Legislator Remains Active
Meanwhile, several laws were passed with the intention of fighting COVID-19.
On the federal level, e.g. on the 25th of March a law was passed to provide the
means to mitigate the economic consequences of the pandemic. The Federal
Introductory Act to the Civil Code (EGBGB) was extended by Article 240, which
contains special contractual rules occasioned by the COVID-19 pandemic. It aims –
among other things – to protect tenants who can no longer pay their rent because of
the crisis. Simultaneously, the Bundestag (Federal Parliament) adopted the largest
assistance package in German history: To build a protective shield for employees,
self-employed people and businesses the Federation issued new loans totaling
roughly 156 billion Euro.
On the very same day, the Bundestag also modified the federal Infection Protection
Act. § 28 I 1 Infection Protection Act contained a general clause according to
which authorities could take “all necessary measures” to fight infectious diseases
(comprehensive overview here). Based on § 28, local authorities, which are
responsible for the enforcement of this Act, have already declared various pandemic
control measures. The hereafter imposed ban on assemblies in public spaces or the
prohibition of religious services in the presence of the congregation were particularly
controversial in that is has been debated whether these measures were lawfully
ordered on the basis of federal Infection Protection Act. However, the legislator
modified § 28 I 1 for reasons of “clarification”. In other words: the legislator did not
extend the scope of § 28. Because of this, the debate whether this norm is a legal
basis for the pointed-out measures will most likely persist.
The parliaments in the Länder are active too: In North Rhine-Westphalia an
"Epidemic Act" was recently discussed but has not yet been passed due to concerns
of the opposition. Meanwhile, in Bavaria an Infection Protection Act (Bavaria) was
passed as early as of March 25th. Article 1 I empowers the Bavarian Government
(Staatsregierung) to declare a “public health emergency” (Gesundheitsnotstand)
when a communicable disease spreads in the general public. When a public health
emergency is declared, as per Article 2, the responsible authority can confiscate
medical material from every private person. Furthermore, according to Articles 5 and
6, the responsible authority can gather information about medical experts and assign
them to work in medical facilities.
In addition, the Bavarian Infection Protection Act also affects the electoral law:
The Bavarian Act on the Election of Municipal Councils, Mayors, County Councils
and Land Councils (Gesetz über die Wahl der Gemeinderäte, der Bürgermeister,
der Kreistage und der Landräte) was also changed on the basis of Article 9a of
the Bavarian Infection Protection Act. The Bavarian legislator had the intention
of reducing the amount of personal contacts within the population to the absolute
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minimum. Hence, presumably for the first time in Germany, a local run-off election
was held only through postal votes in Bavaria on 29th of March 2020.
The Domestication of the State of Emergency
From a legal standpoint, the state of emergency does not play a decisive role in
the German approach to the COVID-19 crisis. Nevertheless, the public discussion
on the state’s reactions frequently refers to this concept (see here, here, here and
here). The reason behind that might be found in the influential work of infamous law
scholar and political theorist Carl Schmitt. In his “Political Theology” he defined the
sovereign as the one deciding on the state of exception, the Ausnahmezustand.
Facing not only an economic and social, but also a life-threatening crisis, some seem
to fear, others seem to hope that the Schmitt’ian prophecy will fulfill itself and the real
sovereign will emerge in the emergency.
So far, no fundamental changes in the legal architecture of the German political
system have been made in response to the spread of COVID-19. Schmitt, having
been member of the German National Socialist Party (NSDAP) and opponent of
parliamentarianism, obviously thought of the executive as the acting state power
– especially in times of crisis – and approved of dictatorship as an instrument to
restore orderly circumstances. It is not surprising that the role of the administration is
now being thoroughly observed in and by the German public. Against the backdrop
of historical impressions, the constitutional approach to the state of emergency in
Germany can be interpreted as an attempt to integrate extraordinary powers in
the regular legal framework of political decision making. The credo could be that
exceptional situations do not need exceptional responses but democratic procedures
and strict application of the rule of law.
Above all, this applies to the role of parliament, whose task it is to create the
legal basis for the administrative branch to act by and in the meantime control
its respective enforcement. During times of COVID-19, participation in plenary
sessions of hundreds of representatives is a risky undertaking. Formal changes
of the parliamentary procedural law as well as informal agreements like the
parliamentary practice of pairing, are made in order to preserve the parliament’s
functionality. These legal measures were based on a broad political consensus to
avoid the suspicion manipulating the distribution of power within parliament. Again,
the suggestion to amend the constitution, made by president of the Bundestag,
Wolfgang Schäuble,was declined by the opposition as well as by representatives
of the majority fractions. In a letter addressed to the leaders of the parliamentary
fractions, Schäuble considered it necessary to modify the rules on the state of
emergency and enable the possibility of an emergency parliament in the current
crisis through the implementation of a new Article 53b. As an alternative, he
suggested virtual parliamentary sessions, which would also require constitutional
modifications. The rejection of these suggestions by the members of parliament
is well justified: A state of emergency is regarded as the wrong time for significant
constitutional changes. Under the given circumstances, which are shaped by
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tremendous uncertainties, the influence of the parliament as a diverse body should
not be limited, especially when those limitations cannot be easily undone.
Although its formal position remains untouched, various constitutional law scholars
(for example here and here) criticize the role of parliament and its legislature in
this emergency. Currently, executive powers are being increased and centralized
while civilian rights have been restricted up to an unknown degree. But is the
warning of a dangerously sovereign government (“fascist-hysterical hygiene-state”)
justified? The complex constitutional architecture balancing the different powers
still seems to work, first and foremost the German federalism. In addition to that,
legal protection through courts is granted despite the health crisis. Although many
judicial proceedings were suspended due to risk of infection in court hearings,
the state’s measures and actions to control the virus can be reviewed through
preliminary legal protection in front of administrative courts. While most of the legal
actions were dismissed, the higher administrative court of Mecklenburg Western
Pomerania suspended the prohibition of trips to the coast of the Eastern Sea due
to its disproportionately on 8th of April, 2020. The Federal Constitutional Court, the
Bundesverfassungsgericht, had to decide over the ban of religious services. The
legal action concerning this matter was dismissed on 10th of April 2020, but the
court demanded a continuous consideration of these “massive interventions into the
freedom of faith” in view of the development of the COVID-19 outbreak.
Critique and Crisis
Weighing the arguments, the threat of getting an authoritarian government whilst
fighting the Corona pandemic in Germany seems very limited. But: the harsh
criticism of the state’s reaction to COVID-19 never touched upon that. Rather,
critics are demanding standards set by the rule of law, especially the observance of
legal procedures and the appropriate justification of civil rights restrictions. Facing
COVID-19 and the difficulty to estimate risks for public health, the authorities are
searching for quick and effective responses. Some suspect that the legality of these
measures could be relegated to a secondary role. The major fear is that if legal
concepts show a lack of validity in times of crisis, their authority might be questioned
under regular conditions too.
Also, the criticism does not remain unchallenged and critics are attacked
themselves. The critics of the critics depict that the threat originating from COVID-19
and the lack of real knowledge of how it can be contained are so great and
unpredictable that authorities have broad leeway to decide how it should be faced.
The government is said to act carefully and responsibly in order to save as many
lives as possible. From their point of view, some critical voices are regarded as
“shrill”, their criticism as not constructive and therefore at times even detrimental.
Amidst the COVID-19 crisis, the ancient question about the notion and conception
of criticism and the (scientific) public sphere in general arises anew (for example
here and here). From one point of view sharp criticism can be identified as a root
or at least a motor for a national crisis due to its questioning the state’s legitimacy.
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From the other perspective, the Ausnahmezustand can be regarded as a situation
in which criticism has to be fierce and insisting in order to prevent the erosion of
key concepts of the constitution like the rule of law and civil rights. The same is
true for the discussion about the introduction of competencies as per the Infection
Protection Act or emergency powers on the constitutional level: Are those necessary
and therefore legitimate measures or do they rather present a dangerous shift of
powers in favor of the executive?
Even if the Corona pandemic will not reveal the Schmitt’ian sovereign, it sheds a
light on the very different perceptions of the state, its boundaries and the role of a
critical public sphere in times of crisis.
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